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Introduction




Direct Brain Interventions and Free Will
A seemingly obvious objection to attempting to alter criminals’ thought-processes through direct brain interventions is the idea that such interventions would deprive the offender of free will. Free will theorists, however, have found the issue of brain interventions surprisingly problematic. One of the main philosophical approaches to the issue of free will - perhaps the dominant approach -  is compatibilism (see the Philpapers Survey 2011). According to compatibilists, a person can still have free will even though all of her thoughts, values and choices are entirely determined by forces beyond her control (e.g. the facts of the remote past and the laws of nature); forces that completely guarantee that she would have precisely those thoughts and values and make precisely those choices.​[2]​ Compatibilists persuasively argue that, even if determinism is true, many agents still  possess a number of characteristics and abilities that are necessary for free will (some of which are discussed below). One can imagine certain forms of brain manipulation that clearly deprive agents of these characteristics and abilities. However, not all brain interventions have this effect. Yet even in these latter cases, using these techniques to modify behaviour can still seem problematic. This section of this article attempts briefly to summarise some of the main trends in compatibilist thinking and to explain why it is not always possible to use compatibilist accounts of free will as the basis for distinguishing ‘normal’ agents from those who have been subject to troubling types of intervention. The following section will provide a different basis for opposing these interventions (regardless of whether or not those who receive them lose their free will).​[3]​
The Rational Flexibility Approach
Compatibilist accounts of freedom often emphasise that intentions, beliefs, desires, motives, decisions etc can still have an important role in explaining our actions even if determinism is true. Determinism just implies that, if our actions are to be explained by reference to such psychological phenomena as mentioned above, then these phenomena were themselves produced by prior events that were causally sufficient for the occurrence of those psychological phenomena and that those prior events were themselves produced in the same manner by even earlier events etc. in an unbroken chain of cause and effect that can be traced back to before the person was even born. Determinism does not imply that people will not modify their behaviour in response to good reasons for doing so. It merely implies that whether a person recognises and responds to one particular reason for action rather than another at any given time is determined by prior events in the manner described above. Flexibility – the ability to adapt oneʼs behaviour in an appropriate way to changes in circumstances – is generally agreed to be a hallmark of rationality (See Dennett 1984). If a person would perform a particular action (e.g. eating lunch) no matter what reasons there were against this (e.g. she knew the meal was poisoned, the house was on fire etc) one would question her rationality. Determinism implies that given the actual circumstances it is inevitable that the agent will behave in one particular way. However, determinism does not imply that the agent must be irrationally inflexible, because there may still be a range of considerations that would induce the person to behave differently if those considerations were present.​[4]​ This capacity to respond to relevant reasons lies at the heart of several influential compatibilist accounts of freedom (See e.g. Fischer and Ravizza 1998 and Vihvelin 2004).​[5]​ 
Certain types of direct interventions may undermine rational flexibility. For instance, a person might have been subjected to conditioning that was so intense that it instilled in her a literally irresistible desire – one which she would not resist under any circumstances. Or the intervention may impair/destroy her understanding so that she cannot grasp any sane reasons for action, or understand how reasons relate to each other (e.g. why one reason is more weighty than another).
However, it is possible to imagine certain intuitively troubling types of intervention that seem to leave rational flexibility intact. For example imagine that the intervener instils a particular desire in the offender. The intervener ensures that the desire is not irresistible. There are a range of incentives that would induce the offender to resist the desire. However, imagine that the intervener herself has selected which incentives (w, x, y and z)​[6]​ will induce the offender to resist the desire. The intervener also ensures that the offender believes that the presence of w, x, y and z would be sufficient reasons against acting on the desire and that the offender has no insane beliefs or insane methods of ‘reasoning’. The intervener has made sure that no other incentives (apart from w, x y and z) will induce the agent to resist the desire. The offender will definitely act on the desire when she is in situations where none of the incentives selected by the intervener are present. 
Now it seems plausible that the offender still has rational flexibility, since she is not prey to irresistible impulses or obviously distorted, ‘crazy’ thinking. However, the intervener has interfered with her in a manner that many would find disturbing.​[7]​ There are three possible ways in which one might try to explain what is wrong with this kind of intervention: Firstly, one might insist that a sufficiently refined account of rational flexibility would show that such interventions actually do deprive the agent of rational flexibility. However, even some leading compatibilists have come to acknowledge that this approach is unlikely to be able to deal with all kinds of problematic interventions (Fischer and Ravizza 1998 pp230-231). ​[8]​ Secondly, one might argue that rational flexibility is not sufficient (although perhaps necessary) for free will and that such interventions are wrong because they interfere with some other aspect of free will, apart from rational flexibility. This paper now will consider and reject various other types of free-will-based objection to direct interventions. The third option is to argue that these interventions are wrong for some reason that is not connected with free will. This is the approach that will ultimately be defended later in this paper.
‘Taking Responsibility’

In response to some of the problems with the rational flexibility approach discussed above, Fischer and Ravizza added a ‘historical’ dimension to their account of free will. According to their (1998) theory, in order for an agent’s actions to be genuinely her own, the agent must have previously ‘taken responsibility’ for the mechanisms from which her actions arise, by viewing herself as being responsible for actions that flow from these mechanisms. By ‘mechanisms’, they mean the features of her agency that play a causal role in her actions (including, but not limited to mental states such as intentions, desires and beliefs). On Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) view, when an agent, at a particular time, comes to take responsibility for a certain type of mechanism, she thereby takes responsibility for her future behaviour that results from the same kind of mechanism. They claim that motivations resulting from direct neurological interventions (almost invariably) involve a different kind of mechanism from ordinary motivations. Therefore, they maintain, when an individual takes responsibility for her ordinary mechanisms she does not thereby typically take responsibility for motivations or actions that arise from neurological interventions.

Yet Fischer and Ravizza’s account still attributes free will to individuals who have received intuitively troubling kinds of direct interventions. For instance, they appear to argue that merely telling a person that she has been manipulated can restore her free will. They write:

‘[Imagine that a] scientist induces (via his direct manipulation of Judith’s brain).... a desire [to punch Jane] that is not literally irresistible but is nevertheless extremely strong [p232].... Now it is possible that Judith becomes aware of the stimulation of her brain by the scientist. She thus can understand the provenance of her previously inexplicable desire to punch. She now has two choices. Presumably, she will modify her desire so that she returns to her normal state (antecedent to the implantation of the desire). Alternatively, it is conceivable that she will decide to keep the new desire, upon reflection. (Perhaps she will have decided that she likes it.) Either way, awareness and reflection returns Judith to the mechanism of ordinary practical reasoning, and she can subsequently be held morally responsible. Awareness and reflection of a certain sort returns Judith to a situation in which she is acting from her own mechanism.’ [p235 emphasis added.]

The above passage implies a person is still responsible, even if she does not endorse the effects of the treatment. Apparently, as soon as she is aware of the manipulation she is free again – free to reject or accept the desire and she is responsible, regardless of which choice she makes. Fischer and Ravizza assert that ‘awareness’ of the treatment will (somehow) enable the person to ‘return to her normal state’, provided there are no literally irresistible impulses.  
Fischer and Ravizza’s ownership requirement (as they have defined it) cannot be relied upon to object to the use of intuitively troubling kinds of direct interventions. There are legitimate worries about the state using brain interventions to instil “extremely strong” desires in offenders (particularly desires of the kind mentioned by Fischer and Ravizza - desires so strong they will only be resisted if the offender knows large numbers of innocent people will die if she acts on the desire). But such interventions would not automatically violate Fischer and Ravizza’s ownership requirement, provided the agent is made aware of the intervention from the start. ​[9]​

 Another, more fundamental problem arises when Fischer and Ravizza (1998) try to explain what makes a mechanism belong to one ‘kind’ rather than another. They do not simply maintain that actions which flow from psychological states like ‘desires’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘intentions’ arise from one type of mechanism and actions that have nothing to do with such psychological states (such as epileptic seizures) belong in a different category. If they settled for this simple account then it would not help them to differentiate reliably between cases of ‘ordinary’ mechanisms and mechanisms produced by intuitively objectionable types of direct interventions. For it is possible to imagine mental states such as desires and beliefs being induced by direct interventions. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) rely heavily on intuition to differentiate between different kinds of mechanism. They maintain that, intuitively, motivations resulting from direct stimulation of the brain belong (in most cases) to a different kind of mechanism from motivations that are determined in the ‘ordinary’ way by one’s genes and environment. This approach is open to challenge. For it seems that the notion of ‘different mechanisms’ is no longer doing the work it was supposed to do. This notion was meant to help explain why we intuitively feel that certain types of direct interventions are problematic. But instead it seems like our intuitions that certain types of direct interventions are problematic dictate whether one mechanism counts as belonging to a ‘different kind’ of mechanism from another. In order for the notion of ‘different mechanisms’ to have explanatory power, Fischer and Ravizza need to have a principled basis for individuating mechanisms, which is derived from “independent reflection on the nature of these mechanisms” (Pereboom, 2006, 200; see also McKenna, 2001). Otherwise, it seems that they are merely stipulating that certain mechanisms are different from others in an ad hoc way in order to generate the conclusions they want about direct interventions. Unfortunately, it is far from obvious that truly independent criteria for individuating mechanisms (e.g. derived from psychology, or neurology) will produce the results that Fischer and Ravizza desire.

The Hierarchical Approach
According to some compatibilists freedom is a matter of achieving a harmony between different elements in one’s psychology. Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) account focussed on the relationship between higher and lower order desires. First order desires are desires to perform actions, e.g. the offender may want to lash out violently. Second order desires have first order desires as their objects, e.g. the offender might want to have his violent impulses; he endorses them. On Frankfurt’s account if an intervener were to alter only a person’s first order desires (e.g. by repressing their violent impulses) that person would be unfree if this resulted in a conflict with their second-order desires. However, strangely, this account implies that a person’s freedom would be unimpaired if the intervener re-shaped both their higher order and lower order desires, provided that the intervener had ensured psychological harmony. This is a significant shortcoming in this account, given that interfering in someone’s psychology to a greater extent by manipulating both types of desire intuitively seems even worse than interfering only with first order desires.

The Authenticity Approach
Some compatibilists maintain that the problem with direct interventions is that the agent’s post-intervention psychology is not authentically her own. One might think that someone’s pro-attitudes are inauthentic if they differ markedly from the person’s previous pro-attitudes, or values. However, this cannot be sufficient to render pro-attitudes inauthentic, given that people can change their pro-attitudes, sometimes within a relatively short space of time. On one version of the authenticity approach, if some of a person’s pro-attitudes are replaced by new ones, the latter are only authentic if the agent adopted them after reflecting on them in the light of her pre-existing value system (Haji and Cuypers 2007). 
However, this does not seem to be a necessary condition for free will. Sometimes people undergo dramatic changes in their pro-attitudes after having an emotionally powerful experience – a kind of ‘road to Damascus event’. For instance a previously selfish person might become much more compassionate after witnessing a natural disaster. The flood of empathy that she feels in response to this event may generate a new insight into how she should live and could cause her simply to abandon her old values. It is not necessary in order for her new pro-attitudes to be authentic that this person must have adopted them after reflecting on them critically in the ‘light’ of her old, corrupt values. 
It might be objected that this type of change is still a response to a reason, whereas changes that occur due to direct interventions by-pass the agent’s rational faculties. In the above example the rush of empathy was caused by something that could provide an appropriate basis for it – i.e. the sight of human suffering. However, a person’s pro-attitudes can change even though she is not presented with a new reason for changing. Consider a person who on one occasion comes to feel the force of a consideration which he had long been aware of, but which had never moved him before. He may suddenly feel that now he ‘gets it’. A person might have this experience because of a non-rational factor, such as an alteration in hormones or neurotransmitters. (See also examples cited in Arpaly 2002.) These factors might, for instance, make the consideration more emotionally salient.​[10]​ But if all such experiences were considered to result in lack of freedom and authenticity then many ordinary people are unfree and inauthentic – which seems implausible. Therefore, a change in pro-attitudes cannot be considered inauthentic and freedom-undermining just because it was brought about partly by non-rational factors. A direct intervention might conceivably operate in a similar way to the case of the ordinary person who suddenly ‘gets it’. If the intervener knew that a person was on the verge of changing his mind, if only the relevant consideration was a bit more emotionally salient, the intervener might alter the person’s brain accordingly. Intervening in another’s mind in this manner remains intuitively troubling, yet for the reasons already given, authenticity approaches have difficulty accounting for this. 
So far this article has criticised various attempts to distinguish agents whom we normally regard as free from agents who have been subject to intuitively troubling brain manipulation. It will now critique a final compatibilist strategy that has gained recent attention, before defending an alternative type of objection to direct interventions that is firmer than free-will based objections.
The Nature/Person Distinction​[11]​
One simple response to the problem of direct interventions is to argue that it is just a basic moral fact that ‘normal’ influences on a person’s psychology (e.g. stemming from one’s genes and standard environmental influences) do not undermine free will, whereas free will is undermined by direct brain interventions by other human beings who are trying to shape the person’s psychology to suit their own ends. On this view, the source of the influence on the individual’s psychology is the crucial factor, even if the actual impact that these influences have are identical. Free will theorists have generally tried to avoid adopting this approach, because of its seeming arbitrariness. However, versions of this response have recently been defended against this charge. It will be argued that although these attempts ultimately fail, nevertheless, they point towards something that is important.
The Responsibility-Shifting Defence
One rationale for the nature/person distinction is based on the idea that when one person intervenes in the mind of another using brain interventions the former takes over responsibility for the results. However, if a person’s mind is shaped by ‘natural’ causes then there is no particular individual who can relieve her of responsibility. Therefore, on this view, responsibility for her actions must rest entirely on her own shoulders. This position is defended by Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel:

“Some claim that pro-attitudes transformed by direct brain interventions such as neuroenhancements derive from mechanisms that are not the agent’s own; hence, the resulting actions are nonautonomous. This is plausible only insofar as agents are manipulated by other agents who then bear primary responsibility, thus exempting the manipulated agent.” (Bublitz and Merkel 2009, p373)

It is important to note that, according to Bublitz and Merkel, what the manipulator actually does to the manipulated person is not intrinsically freedom-undermining. They launch a powerful attack on the notion of ‘authenticity’ arguing that a person is not rendered unfree even if she undergoes a radical transformation due to a process that bypasses her rationality. They state that 
“Having self-arranged for all of these bypassing transformations is too demanding a condition [for free will]. If we take that criterion seriously, then the majority of our pro-attitudes would have to be declared inauthentic and all the resulting actions nonautonomous. There is no self-creation ex nihilo. From one’s sex and other bodily constitutions through to moods, core character traits, behavioural dispositions, social environments and natural endowments, there exist myriad influences on the formation of pro-attitudes that bypass rational control, depend on natural contingencies and are not self-arranged.”  (Bublitz and Merkel 2009, p371)
Bublitz and Merkel even go so far as to say that a person who takes prescribed medication that (as an entirely unforeseen side effect) drastically alters her character and values remains free and responsible provided that she satisfies Harry Frankfurt’s requirement – that she identifies with her new desires. Given these views, Bublitz and Merkel’s approach to manipulation seems rather odd. It seems to involve the claim that manipulators function as ‘blame magnets’.​[12]​ If a person is ‘lucky’ enough to have been influenced by a blame magnet then she can violate norms with impunity - the responsibility for all these acts sticks to the blame magnet. However, if a person were unlucky enough to have been influenced by forces short of manipulation (forces that may have been equally powerful and equally outwith her control) then she must take all the blame.  It is also puzzling why the fact that the manipulator bears some degree of responsibility, should thereby relieve the manipulated person from responsibility. Why cannot they both be held fully responsible? 
A further problem arises if there is any question over whether the manipulator herself possessed the capacities that are required for responsibility. Perhaps the manipulator was mentally ill. In this case it does not seem as if she can function as a blame magnet, because she is an inappropriate candidate for blame. We therefore get the paradoxical conclusion that the question of whether X (the manipulated person) is responsible for her actions depends on whether Y (the manipulator) was sane. One would have to assess the capacities of Y in order to establish the responsibility status of X!​[13]​
Do existing practices support the nature/person distinction?
According to Bublitz and Merkel (2009, p372), “from a normative perspective, there is a widely agreed difference” between nature and persons. Bublitz and Merkel are of course correct in this assertion. In fact, there are many widely agreed differences between nature and persons. For instance, you cannot reason with a storm about whether it is a good idea to damage people’s property and you cannot deter a volcano from erupting by threatening to punish it unless it behaves itself. But Bublitz and Merkel’s case will only be persuasive if they can identify a difference between nature and persons that is relevant to their argument. Here are the examples they rely on: 

Case 1
“Doctor D asks patient P for consent to remove his cancerous kidney – otherwise, it is certain that P will shortly die, say within the next month. P consents and the kidney is removed.”(Bublitz and Merkel 2009, p372) Here P’s consent is valid.
Case 2
“Being held at gunpoint, P is ‘asked’ to consent to the removal of his kidney in order to transplant it to the coercer’s son; otherwise P will die with a bullet through his head. P consents and the kidney is removed.” (Bublitz and Merkel 2009, p372.) Here P’s consent is invalid.
These examples would be relevant to Bublitz and Merkel’s argument if the examples could bear the following interpretation: In case 1, the patient is still exercising his free will when he agrees to receive medical treatment, despite the fact that his consent arises from an intense pressure, whereas the patient in case 2 is not exercising his free will, despite being subject to a pressure of the same intensity (equally life-threatening). On this interpretation, what makes the difference between the patient being free in case 1 and lacking freedom in case 2 is the source of the pressure that they are under – nature in the first case, a person in the second. This appears to be the conclusion that Bublitz and Merkel want us to draw from their examples. In support of their argument, they invoke Joel Feinberg’s view that pressures from nature are usually just “background conditions” and do not deprive the person of free will or voluntariness, whereas a human threat amounts to an “intervening force, rendering his decision involuntary”. (Feinberg 1989)
However, this would not be the correct way to analyse these examples. It is a mistake to infer that P’s consent in case 2 is necessarily invalid because it was involuntary. Lack of voluntariness is one ground on which consent may be invalidated but it is not the only ground. To see what other grounds there may be it is necessary to consider what role a valid consent serves in cases such as the kidney transplant examples. In such cases, a valid consent provides the doctor with a defence to assault. If the patient’s consent to treatment is valid, the doctor has not wronged the patient by treating him. Why does consent serve this function? By acting with the patient’s consent, the doctor shows respect for the patient’s preferences. The doctor treats the patient as a being worthy of moral consideration and does not treat him ‘merely as a means’. (Kant  1948)
Sometimes a person completely lacks the capacities necessary for free will/voluntariness e.g. he may be insane, and so any apparent ‘consent’ he gives is not valid. Typically the best way to respect such a person’s status as a being with moral worth is to act in the person’s ‘best interests’. On other occasions, voluntariness is severely restricted, although not completely lacking. In such cases, giving weight to the degree of voluntariness that still exists can show respect for the person as an end in himself. Consent can then be used as a defence. However, sometimes the person who wishes to rely on the consent is not genuinely showing respect for the degree of voluntariness that exists, but, rather, has associated herself with the restriction on voluntariness. 
In case 1 the patient’s freedom is severely restricted by the threat of death from the kidney disease, but his consent is not entirely involuntary (assuming that he is not so overwhelmed by the fear of death that he is incapable of rational thought.) The doctor, however, has not associated herself with the restriction on the patient’s voluntariness – the doctor is not responsible for it, nor is she exploiting it. She is definitely showing respect for the patient as a being worthy of moral consideration, both by paying attention to his preferences and by trying to save his life. In case 2, the patient has the same degree of voluntariness as in case 1 (again assuming that he is not so overwhelmed by the fear of death that he is incapable of rational thought.) However, the gunman stands in a different relation to the patient’s voluntariness from the doctor. The gunman has associated himself with the restriction on voluntariness – he was responsible for it. The gunman cannot rely on the degree of voluntariness that the patient still has as a defence, because the gunman is not showing respect for the patient as an end in himself.
On my interpretation of the above cases, the source of the restriction on X’s voluntariness is relevant to whether Y can rely on the degree of voluntariness that X still has as a defence. If Y is the source of the restriction, then Y is barred from defending herself by saying “look, X’s decision was restricted but not entirely involuntary, and I respected what little freedom X had left”, because Y has already shown immense disrespect for X by being the cause of the illegitimate restriction on X’s freedom. The approach defended in this article explains the difference between case 1 and case 2 in a way that makes sense and which appeals to an already widely accepted principle – the idea that people should be respected as ends in themselves.​[14]​
 In contrast, the approach advocated by Bublitz and Merkel (and Feinberg) relies on a counter-intuitive stipulation - the idea that the presence or absence of a person’s free will depends on whether the person is being influenced by a human pressure or a natural one. By what mysterious alchemy does a human pressure render a decision unfree which would otherwise be free if only the pressure came from a natural source? Normally we consider free will, or voluntariness to depend on capacities and opportunities. But natural pressures can affect a person’s capacities and opportunities just as much as human pressures and natural pressures can be just as much beyond the individual’s control as pressures from other human beings. There are many contexts in which it is obvious that the nature/person distinction makes no difference to a person’s freedom. If a person is paralysed, her freedom is just as constrained whether the paralysis arose from an attack by another person or from a disease. If a person commits a crime and argues that she should be excused because she was threatened with death or serious injury, the success of her defence does not depend on whether the threat arose from nature (necessity) or a human being (coercion). Why should an exception be made where the nature/person distinction suddenly becomes relevant to whether the person is free? There are no independent grounds for accepting this distinction (i.e. independent of the needs of Bublitz and Merkel’s argument).
For the reasons stated above, examples involving the issue of valid consent do not appear to provide support for the nature/person distinction. This distinction seems a shaky basis for objecting to directly intervening in the minds of others. An intervention is no more or less likely to turn someone into a puppet merely because it is caused by a human being rather than nature. However, the consent examples do point to another basis for objecting to direct interventions. They suggest that the reason why a person may not rely on another’s consent sometimes depends on the nature of the relationship between the people concerned rather than on the fact that the ‘consenting’ person entirely lacked free will.  The basis upon which this article objects to certain types of direct interventions is also concerned with the relationship between the intervener and the subject of the intervention. 

Direct Interventions and Objectification
Bublitz and Merkel are correct to draw attention to the blameworthiness of manipulators. Those who directly intervene in the minds of others sometimes act wrongfully. These theorists are not correct to claim that the fact that someone has been wronged by a direct intervention means that the person is therefore unfree.  However, it is not necessary to argue that direct interventions always undermine freedom in order to object to direct interventions.
In order to see why some direct interventions are objectionable it is useful to return to the idea that a person who has been subjected to direct brain interventions is transformed into a mere ‘puppet’, an ‘automaton’ or a ‘robot’. This paper has argued that to the extent that this charge is meant to convey the idea that the person now has as little free will as a puppet then this is inaccurate. However, it is sometimes true that subjecting a person to direct brain interventions would amount to treating her as if she were a puppet, an automaton or a robot – as something less than human. In other words it would ‘objectify’ her.
The term ‘objectification’ can be used in different ways. The conception of objectification which is adopted in this article is influenced by discussions of the ways in which disfavoured groups within society have historically been objectified (see e.g., Reicher, 2006). This kind of objectification typically involves creating a division between ‘them’ and ‘us’ which excludes the objectified group. It also typically involves portraying the disfavoured group as radically deficient in some fundamental respect. The idea of objectification can be usefully contrasted with the idea of respecting personhood. Personhood can be respected by preserving connections between the group in question and other members of society and by highlighting commonalities between members of the group and other citizens. There is a danger that society’s (often) justified horror at and condemnation of criminal acts will lead to objectification of offenders. It is therefore particularly important to have clear restrictions on the ways in which the state may treat offenders, in order that society does not lose sight of their personhood.
It may be objected that punishment inevitably does some of the things that have been described as ‘objectifying’. Punishment inevitably excludes offenders from society (sometimes by physically imprisoning them and also by the stigma attached to a conviction). Punishment inevitably highlights differences between the offender and other citizens. However, it is submitted that the criminal justice system can and should take measures to ensure that offenders are not entirely excluded from society and that the criminal justice system can and should highlight offenders’ common humanity as well as the ways in which offenders have deviated from the standards of behaviour expected of citizens.
One important way in which the criminal justice system can recognise the personhood of offenders is by ensuring that any attempt to reform and rehabilitate offenders occurs through dialogue with the offender, e.g. through victim offender mediation schemes, or through a mentoring relationship with a probation officer.​[15]​ This ensures that we do not entirely cut offenders off from the rest of society, but instead continue to engage with them. Maintaining relationships between offenders and other citizens in this way makes it less likely that society loses sight of offenders’ humanity.  Dialogue is a two-way process. It allows the offender the opportunity to put forward his own point of view. The offender will usually not persuade society that he is in the right (although this has sometimes happened) but he may force society to confront some of the pressures that led the offender to commit his crime – pressures for which wider society may share some degree of responsibility. The two-way nature of dialogue acknowledges another important commonality between offenders and other citizens (including the authorities) – the fact that the authorities and majority opinion, like the offender, are fallible. Attempts to reform offenders through dialogue also typically appeal to the offender’s better nature. This implies that, like other citizens, the offender is not entirely bad. (For a discussion of a way in which moral dialogue can appeal to ‘the good that is in’ the offender, see Duff 1986, p266; see also Stern, 1974 on moral dialogue.)
In contrast, it is submitted that certain types of direct interventions (although not all direct interventions) objectify offenders and should be ruled out. Attempting to re-shape offender’s values using direct interventions is unacceptable. It excludes offenders by portraying them as a group to whom we need not listen (at least not until we have modified them to ensure they will tell us what we want to hear). The authorities do not have the moral status to set themselves up as having such infallible access to the right values that they may take it upon themselves to directly remould such a fundamental aspect of citizens’ characters. Conferring such a power of the authorities (in addition to the already considerable means they have at their disposal for controlling behaviour) would set the authorities on a completely different plane from offenders, massively widening the inequality of power between them. Directly re-shaping values also implies that offenders are radically defective with regard to one of the most fundamental aspects of their agency. This sends out a more extreme message than that conveyed by traditional punishment -that the offender committed a wrong on a particular occasion.
It is also submitted that altering an offender’s values using direct interventions would be unacceptable even if the offender requested such treatment. The offender’s consent could not legitimise this practice because the practice affects societyʼs stance towards offenders as a group. The very act of offering this type of intervention to offenders would send out the message that all offenders who are offered the intervention stand in need of it, whether or not they ultimately agree to it. This practice has the potential to be socially divisive and its effects are not limited to those offenders who give their consent. Therefore the offenderʼs consent is not sufficient to make it morally acceptable.


A Role for Direct Interventions ?
These considerations suggest that the state should not use neurotechnologies to try to ensure that the offender adopts the state’s favoured values. Direct interventions should not be employed in an attempt to create citizens who are models of ‘responsibility’ in the virtue sense. (For more on the importance of this distinction, see Vincent 2011.) Efforts to reform the offender should be through rational dialogue. However, this article does not oppose the use of all direct interventions within the criminal justice system. Neurotechnologies could potentially play a role in enabling certain offenders to engage in moral dialogue and could help the offender to become reintegrated back into the community. However, clear limitations must be imposed on the use of such technologies. Firstly, they should only be used in order to increase the offender’s capacity responsibility by restoring/enhancing his ability to engage in moral dialogue and practical reasoning, and should never aim to restrict his powers of critical reflection, or to directly re-shape his values. Secondly, brain interventions should never replace attempts to engage the offender in human relationships. Thirdly, direct interventions are only permissible with the offender’s consent.
This proposal raises the following questions: 1) to what extent is it possible to distinguish between interventions that enhance an offender’s capacities and those that re-shape his values? 2) Is it possible to obtain valid consent to direct interventions within the coercive context of the criminal justice system?​[16]​ These issues will be addressed in the remainder of this article.

Distinguishing Values from Capacities
So far it has been argued that the state should not attempt to control an offender’s values using direct interventions, but that it may be permissible to enhance his capacity to grasp the relevant considerations, so that he is better able to decide for himself which values to adopt. The next question is how this distinction between enhancing capacities and re-shaping values is to be drawn in practice.
Re-shaping Values – Central cases
It is possible to imagine certain types of intervention that clearly aim to re-shape the offender’s values. For instance, the state might try to influence offenders by sending out subliminal messages promoting the state’s favoured values, while the offender is watching TV in his cell. Or it might, in the future, become possible to develop a device which transmits such messages that might be installed in the offender’s brain. Another clearly unacceptable technique would be to try to modify the offender’s brain to make him very suggestible, impair his powers of critical reflection and then bombard him with propaganda. (Even more extreme interventions have been discussed in the free will literature –e.g. assuming that psychological properties, such as those that are involved in valuing are identical with or are nomically paired with brain states, it is conceivable that the authorities could operate on the offender’s brain in order to render his values qualitatively identical to the values of a ‘model citizen’. However, thankfully, it seems unlikely that knowledge of the brain will advance enough to make that technically possible in the foreseeable future.)

Enhancing Capacities – Central Cases
Certain types of intervention seem to be relatively straightforward instances of enhancing capacities. One example is the idea of increasing the offender’s power of attention. Recent studies suggest that individuals who score highly on measures for psychopathy may suffer from a kind of attention-deficit disorder which may help to explain their characteristic anti-social behaviour. ​[17]​ It seems that when presented with incentives for performing an action these individuals lose sight of the reasons against performing the action. Neurological enhancements might be developed that enable these individuals to focus on all the relevant considerations (and in particular the reasons against breaking the law). 
Difficulties with delaying gratification may lie behind some individuals’ tendency to break the law. Neurological enhancements may potentially help to rehabilitate criminals through enhancing their ability to delay gratification. ​[18]​
Certain offenders seem to lack the normal bodily responses to stimuli. There is some evidence to suggest that the emotional quality of an experience (e.g. whether it was rewarding or aversive) are normally ‘remembered’ by the body and when the person is contemplating facing the stimuli again they experience a bodily reaction in anticipation of the stimuli, like a kind of warning system. People whose warning system is lacking or defective may be more likely repeatedly to engage in self-defeating behaviour, and may also be more likely to reoffend (see Blair, 2008). Direct interventions aimed at helping such people seem to fall into the enhancing capacities category.
Borderline Cases
There is not always a razor sharp line between using neurotechnologies to directly re-shape offenders’ values and the use of these techniques to enhance offenders’ capacities for responsible agency). For example, an intervention might reduce the strength of an offender’s violent and/or deviant sexual impulses. It might be argued that this is a method of enhancing offenders’ rational capacities, because intense, repetitive urges or fantasies can cloud an individual’s judgement, making practical reasoning difficult. Reducing the strength and frequency of these urges could put the offender in a better position to focus on the reasons that are relevant to his decision about how he should act. Alternatively, it might be argued that interfering with offenders’ urges is a method of directly re-shaping their values, because an offender who values violence or deviant sexual conduct might do so partly as a result of experiencing these impulses and urges. 

Another borderline case is the capacity for empathy. There are both conceptual and empirical reasons for thinking that this capacity is necessary genuinely to appreciate what is wrong about harming others.  For instance, individuals with markedly reduced levels of empathy have exhibited difficulties in distinguishing conventional rules (such as rules of etiquette) from moral rules and in ranking wrongs in order of seriousness. However, it also seems likely that one’s degree of empathy plays a role in moral motivation (as well as understanding) and in which values one ends up adopting. 

Dealing with Borderline Cases
The issue of borderline cases can be decided partly on the basis of the principles that have already been outlined in this paper. One relevant consideration is the amount of control which the intervention would allow the state to exert over the agent’s decisions about what he should do. The greater the state’s level of control, the greater the inequality between the offender and the rest of the community. Interventions which merely reduce the strength of an offender’s violent impulses, do not give the state the power to ensure that the offender endorses the state’s favoured values. The offender may still reject societyʼs demands. Similarly, it seems unlikely that interventions that increase a person’s empathy to within normal levels would thereby determine which values the individual will adopt. People with normal levels of empathy often behave callously and have less than caring values. One possible objection to enhancing the capacity for empathy is that there are some situations when the person cannot help but exercise this capacity. However, there are many capacities of which this is true, such as the capacity to read or to understand a language. People rarely raise objections to literacy courses in prisons or to teaching non-native speakers English. Furthermore, exercising such skills can also plausibly affect people’s values, perhaps allowing them to become more integrated in the community. There are also various ways in which people can repress their capacity for empathy.  But such interventions are less troubling than interventions that allow the state to shape the offender’s behaviour and inner life to a greater extent. 

Interventions that would alter an attribute which is central to who the person is, as an agent, are particularly troubling. A particularly fundamental alteration sends out a strong message that the offender is radically defective, and unlike the rest of ‘us’. Again, it is submitted that a momentary impulse, or urge is less central to the offender’s agency than, say, a firm commitment to a particular principle or course of action. Interventions that directly target ‘second order desires’ are also particularly problematic. It is plausible that second order desires are at least partly constitutive of values, since they concern what kind of person the agent wants himself to be. Bublitz and Merkel note that some pharmaceuticals seem to promote a positive view of oneself and an experience of authenticity – a feeling of ‘really being oneself’. If an intervention instilled new first-order desires, and was accompanied by authenticity-enhancing medication, then this could cause the individual to identify with his new first order desires. This could amount to an objectionable interference with the offender’s second order desires. 

Even interventions which only target first order desires may give the state an unacceptable level of control over the agent’s values and character if the agent’s first order desires are extensively altered. For instance, imagine an offender who has a corrupt value system according to which acts of terrible cruelty are morally permissible. This offender also, by nature, has an aggressive temperament and has always been extremely insensitive to others’ distress.  Imagine that the state managed, through direct interventions, greatly to reduce his aggressive feelings, so that he became more placid than most non-criminals, and that direct interventions were also used in order to greatly increase his empathy so that he could not bear the slightest sign that another was suffering. This course of treatment seems to go beyond an attempt to put the offender in a better position to understand what is wrong about harming others. It seems likely that this use of direct interventions could have a significant impact on his higher order desires and values, even though this is not inevitable (an even-tempered person who does not like to witness violence first-hand could still endorse cruelty and violence). Furthermore, the fact that the offender’s aggressiveness and empathy have both shifted from one end of the spectrum to the other suggests that he has undergone a fundamental personality change and, as argued above, implementing extreme changes to the offender’s character sends out a stronger message that the offender’s pre-existing character is fundamentally defective and that the offender is incapable of change through normal social interaction. 

Nicole Vincent is sceptical about whether we are currently able to distinguish reliably between capacities and fundamental character traits/values. She is particularly concerned that altering offenders’ values/character traits might undermine the offender’s authenticity or even transform the offender into a different ‘self’. She concedes that we cannot be certain that direct interventions would have this effect. However, she insists that we do not need certainty about this in order to be justified in ruling out the use of direct interventions to modify ‘borderline traits’. She writes:
“...we currently have no way to distinguish character flaws from capacity deficits, and thus ... to be on the safe side we should abstain from ‘treating’ people with direct brain interventions until we have gathered more empirical data on this topic and analysed the conceptual basis of the distinction between capacity and character”.(Vincent 2011, p52)
Despite the critique of the notion of authenticity presented earlier in this article, Vincent is right to insist that all such arguments still leave room for doubt. (Furthermore, some idea of authenticity may still be of value even if it is not essential for free will.) Granted that this area involves uncertainty, it is less clear that abstaining from all direct interventions amounts to staying on the ‘safe side’. A number of different interests need to be balanced.  Given that offenders are liable to state interference of some sort, it may be difficult to determine whether treatment or traditional punishment is the safer option. What is safer for the offender may not be safer for the public. Even if we give more weight to the offender’s interests than the interests of the state, it is far from clear that abstaining from direct interventions would be safer than, say, prison. As Lawrence Stern notes: “It is true that prison does not aim to subvert rational or moral capacity... But it can break a man. A man can emerge from prison no more able to commit a crime than to walk into a fire.”  (Stern 1974, p80). Even if we are concerned primarily with promoting the authenticity of the offender, there are compelling reasons in favour of treatments such as empathy enhancement, or treatment to reduce impulsivity or violent urges. 
On one plausible interpretation of authenticity, an authentic individual has an appropriate degree of self-knowledge. If someone is completely deluded about such things as her own virtues, vices, abilities and limitations then that seems to undermine her authenticity. For instance, the character Cordelia in The Fountain Overflows is deluded that she is a talented violinist. She has tremendous technical skill and perfect pitch but she is deeply unmusical – her skill is merely mechanical, she lacks musical sensitivity. Her life is centred around her supposed musical talent and the sycophantic people who pretend to admire it. Imagine that one day she ‘wakes up’ from her delusion, realises that she will never be a great violinist but then discovers she has a genuine talent for something else and builds on that. Her new life would seem more authentic than her old lifestyle.

 This emphasis on the self-discovery element of authenticity fits with the experience of patients with ADHD, a number of whom have reported feeling that taking Ritalin to reduce their impulsivity helped them to feel authentic. “It’s not that you’re not yourself anymore. I believe I have always been myself, but because the medication makes you more tranquil you start to look differently at yourself. You take more time for yourself. And you discover things that you did not expect of yourself.” In fact, she discovered that she was a good painter and enjoyed painting a lot. Another respondent also said that he felt more ‘himself’ on medication. He was more able
to control his impulses and his life moved more smoothly. He also felt calmer on medication and this gave him more ‘time for himself’: “I haven’t read a book in years because I couldn’t concentrate. But now I’m reading again. I used to read a lot when I was younger”. (Boltand Scherner 2009, p106)






Direct interventions should only be used if the offender gives his informed consent. By according weight to the offender’s preferences, the state treats the offender as a person who still has moral worth and whose wishes are not completely discounted. The state shows respect for the offender’s rationality, by allowing him to weigh the advantages and disadvantages for him of enhancement versus, for instance, spending a longer time in prison, and trusting that he is able to make an appropriate decision. 

It might be objected that even if an offender agreed to accept cognitive enhancements in preference to other methods of reform/rehabilitation, this would not amount to genuine, free consent, given the coercive situation in which the offender finds himself.  In response, it is submitted that allowing the offender some say in the matter still shows respect for his preferences, even though the offender’s options are limited. However, it is also submitted that limiting the offender’s options can be justified by the need to protect society and by the value of reforming the offender and restoring him to the community. The ‘consent requirement’ strikes a balance between these interests and the offender’s interests in not being forced to receive biomedical interventions.

Lene Bomann Larsen (2011) persuasively argues that, despite the coercive circumstances, an offender can sometimes give a valid consent to behaviour treatment (including direct interventions) when this is offered as a condition of early release from prison. She argues that in order for the consent to be valid the offer of treatment must be ‘appropriate’. Firstly, in order to be appropriate an offer of treatment must be a genuine offer and not a threat. If the state were to tell the offender that his sentence would be increased if he did not accept treatment then this would amount to a threat. However, if the offender has already been sentenced to imprisonment as the prescribed penalty for his crime then the fact that his options are limited does not wrong the offender – the restriction on his freedom is legitimate. The second requirement for an offer to be appropriate is that the treatment must be narrowly targeted at addressing the behaviour for which the criminal was convicted. The criminal is properly accountable to the state for this behaviour, but not for other areas of his life. For example, it would not be appropriate for the state to make the release of a sexual offender conditional on treatment that just aimed to make him a more agreeable person, because having an unpleasant manner is not a crime and this aspect of the offender’s life is none of the law’s business.

Bomann-Larsen’s account seems basically sound with the following qualification. It is important to add that the offer of treatment can only be legitimate if the law under which the offender was sentenced was just. For example, in 1952 Alan Turing the celebrated mathematician/logician (well known for his contribution to the war effort as a cryptologist) was convicted under a statute that proscribed homosexual behaviour and was given the choice between prison and chemical castration. Turing presumably satisfied both of Bomann-Larsen’s requirements for a valid consent – he knew that his behaviour was punishable and the treatment was targeted at addressing the criminal behaviour of which he was convicted. However, because he was convicted under an unjust law his consent to treatment, in Bomann-Larsen’s terminology failed to ‘take the wronging out of the act’ of treating him.​[19]​





This article has argued that compatibilists face considerable difficulties in objecting to direct interventions on the basis that they violate free will. However, there is an alternative objection to certain types of intervention available to them, which does not rely on the free will issue. Attempting to enhance virtue responsibility by using neurological interventions to modify offenders’ values would risk creating the wrong kind of relationship between the state and offenders. However, his paper does not oppose all neurological interventions within the criminal justice system. It has outlined some relevant considerations for assessing techniques that may emerge in the future
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^1	  It might be questioned whether these interventions are genuinely enhancements or whether they are treatments. I will use the term ‘enhancement’ because they are not strictly needed in order to treat a disease.
^2	  Compatibilists maintain that even if a person lacks control over the factors that determine her action, she may still control the action itself.
^3	  It might be thought that compatibilism as a whole fails if it cannot demonstrate that victims of intuitively troubling brain manipulation lack compatibilist free will. However, some compatibilists defend their theory by insisting that certain victims of manipulation are in fact free, despite the initial counter-intuitiveness of this conclusion. This paper is neutral on whether compatibilism as a whole is successful. I merely claim that intuitively-objectionable kinds of brain interventions do not necessarily undermine free will in the compatibilist sense and that therefore we must look for another type of objection to such interventions.
^4	  Strictly speaking, Fischer and Ravizza (1998) emphasise that, in order for the agent to be free, it must be true that the ‘mechanism’ underlying the agent’s action would react to at least one reason for behaving differently, rather than that the agent herself would react to that reason (although, in most cases, if the mechanism would react then the agent herself would also react). See text in the next section for more on mechanisms.
^5	  Compatibilists differ over whether the flexibility possessed by rational agents in a deterministic world genuinely amounts to a capacity to behave differently from the way that one in fact behaves. The following theorists argue that it does: Fara 2008; Vihvelin 2004. The following theorists disagree, maintaining that the (mechanism’s) disposition to react differently if different reasons were present is simply a feature of the way in which the agent actually behaves: Fischer and Ravizza 1998.
^6	  In this example there are only four possible considerations that would induce the agent to act differently. But the intervention would still be troubling even if the intervener had selected a larger number of considerations. It should be noted, however, that it would be unreasonable to demand that the agent must be responsive to a very wide range of considerations for acting differently. Many normal agents adhere to certain courses of action in a very rigid way, and would only depart from that course under fairly extreme conditions and yet are considered free (if sometimes fanatical, or sometimes principled). They may even be blamed or praised for their rigidity. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p70) stipulate that it is only necessary for there to be one consideration that would cause the agent’s mechanism to react differently. 
^7	  It might be thought that accounts of rational flexibility are deeply flawed if they imply that agents still possess this rational flexibility despite having been manipulated in the way described above. These agents, it might be said, cannot really have rational flexibility. However, it is not the aim of this paper to argue that such accounts are flawed qua ‘accounts of rational flexibility’. This paper is neutral as to whether or not the subjects of these interventions really do have rational flexibility. The point is just that the compatibilist theories being discussed imply that they do, and so these accounts of rational flexibility cannot be used in order to object to these interventions. Compatibilists who want to hold on to their theories, but still oppose these interventions should find another way of objecting to these interventions that is not based on rational flexibility (such as the objection that I defend later in this paper). 
^8	   Fischer and Ravizza write: ‘...ahistorical....accounts cannot adequately treat such cases... What seems relevant is not only the fact that the mechanism issuing in the action is suitably reasons-responsive; what also matters is how that mechanism has been put in place.”
^9	  Fischer and Ravizza do acknowledge that a person is non-responsible if she has received further manipulation designed to make her endorse the desires that have been implanted in her. However, I think that implanting extremely strong desires in offenders can be objectionable per se whether or not the offender has been programmed to endorse them.
^10	  Or indeed non-rational factors could influence behaviour by making certain factors less salient. It is conceivable that a reduction in testosterone might somewhat reduce an individual’s attraction to anti-social behaviour (relative to their other desires) and this might on a particular occasion ‘tip the scales’ for an individual, causing them to decide to engage in a more law abiding activity instead. For instance, there is some evidence that testosterone levels can influence pro-attitudes connected with anti-social behaviour. It has been suggested that a natural decline in testosterone in men as they age may sometimes partly account for a reduced inclination to reoffend (Quinsey 2002, p3), or a reduction in certain kinds of sexual reoffending in particular (Barberee et al, 2003). If it turns out that fluctuating testosterone levels do indeed influence pro-attitudes, this surely does not by itself show that the individuals concerned lack free will. It is therefore implausible to suggest that influencing a person’s behaviour partly through a non-rational means necessarily deprives them of free will.
^11	  The term is taken from Bublitz and Merkel (2009)
^12	  My term.
^13	   It might be objected that the victim of manipulation is non-responsible regardless of whether the manipulator was sane or insane. However, the objector must then explain why an insane manipulator is relevantly different from ‘ordinary’ deterministic forces. The objector cannot use Bublitz and Merkel’s argument that the manipulator’s own culpability deflects blame away from the manipulated agent.
^14	  I do not claim that this is the only basis for deciding whether or not someone can rely on another person’s apparent consent. The rules governing consent vary depending on the context, e.g. whether consent is being used as a criminal defence, or in the context of the validity of different types of contract. Public policy considerations may often be influential, e.g. the idea that it is important not to undermine stable contractual relationships by too frequent challenges concerning the freedom of the contracting parties. It may be argued that certain constraints on freedom are so widespread that it would be impossible for any contract to be relied on if these constraints were allowed to render the contract invalid. Yet these pragmatic considerations cannot shed light on whether people subjected to such constraints really are free or unfree. It is impossible within the scope of this article to give a full discussion of all the different considerations that may have a bearing on the validity of consent in every context. However, the proponents of the nature/person distinction have not produced an example which clearly supports their position.
^15	  For one account of how the penal system could be reformed to place more emphasis on moral dialogue see Duff, 2001.
^16	  My position on this second issue is informed by Larsen 2011.
^17	  For an interesting discussion of this issue see J Newman et al, ‘Attention Moderates the Fearlessness of Psychopathic Offenders’ (2010) 67 Biological Psychiatry 66.
^18	  This issue is discussed in J Kennett, ‘Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?’ (2006) 9(1) philosophical Explorations 69.
^19	  It should also be noted that the intervention in this case did not conform with my second justification for allowing the offender to consent to medical interventions as part of his rehabilitation, i.e. the value of protecting society and of facilitating the offender’s efforts to reform. Chemical castration could in no way have furthered these ends, because Turing’s homosexuality gave rise to no danger to society and no need for him to ‘reform’.
